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Introduction
The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have
the power "[tio promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."' The policy behind the grant
of copyright and patent powers is "the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare."12 In accordance with this power, Congress enacted the Patent
Code3 to extend the protection of patents to inventors4 and the United
States Copyright Act to offer copyright protection to authors. 5
Congress also passed the Lanham Act to offer protection for trade-
marks.6 The main purpose behind the Lanham Act is Congress' desire to
protect consumers from possible confusion of source or sponsorship.
Unlike the patent and copyright laws, the authority for the Lanham Act
does not stem directly from a specific constitutional clause but from
broader commerce powers delegated to congress by the Constitution.
Inherent in the grant of a patent, trademark, or copyright is the
owners' right to bring a claim against one who infringes this exclusive
domain.7 In some instances a patent infringer can defend the action
based upon the culpable conduct of the inventor. This equitable claim is
the misuse defense. Since both the patent and copyright acts find their
authority in the same clause of the Constitution, there has been much
discussion on whether the misuse defense can also be raised by a copy-
right infringer.
This article will discuss the evolution and development of the patent
misuse defense from its inception in early case law to the present day case
law and codified version. Next, this article will discuss the applicability
of the misuse defense in the context of copyrights from the early confu-
sion to the present disagreement concerning the status, and even the
existence, of the copyright misuse defense. Then, the article will discuss
expansion of the misuse defense to the area of trademark law. Finally,
the article will summarize the present state of the misuse defense as it
pertains to patents, copyright and trademarks and discuss its impact on
today's practitioner.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
3. 35 U.S.C §§ 1-376 (1988) (enacted 1952).
4. A patent offers the inventor the exclusive right to use, manufacture, or sell the pat-
ented item, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988), for 17 years, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988) (enacted 1947 and revised in its entirety in 1976).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988) (enacted 1946).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988) (copyright infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) (trademark
infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988) (patent infringement).
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I
The Patent Misuse Defense
A. History
The defense of patent misuse embodies the rationale that a court will
not assist a patent owner in using a patent in an inequitable manner. It is
an old maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity. This philosophy
is the basis of the unclean hands defense. Generally, a plaintiff is pre-
cluded from obtaining assistance from a court of equity when the defend-
ant can show that plaintiff is guilty of inequitable conduct.8 It is from
this equitable defense that the intellectual property misuse defense has
evolved. The misuse defense allows accused infringers to point to specific
instances of inequitable conduct by the plaintiff and request a court of
equity to deny the plaintiff relief.9
American courts have only recently recognized the misuse defense.
As late as 1934, this legal theory had been rejected as an invalid defense
to patent infringement.10 However, in 1942, the United States Supreme
Court set a new precedent.
The seminal case for the patent misuse defense is Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger." Morton brought a suit claiming that the defendant had
infringed Morton's patent in a salt-depositing machine. 12 There was a
provision in Morton's patent license agreement which required Morton's
licensees to purchase unpatented salt tablets from Morton. Morton's
patent only extended to the machine and not to the salt tablets.
The defendant claimed that Morton's tying arrangement was viola-
tive of the antitrust laws and, as such, should preclude an enforcement of
Morton's patent. The defendant was not one of Morton's licensees and
suffered no direct harm as a result of the licensing arrangement. 13 The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant was merely attempting to set forth an
unclean hands defense. Morton argued that where the complained of
conduct does not arise out of the issue in dispute, the unclean hands
doctrine is inapplicable.14
8. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 98 (14th ed. 1918).
9. See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 31:15, at 587-88 (2d ed. 1984).
10. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 10 F. Supp. 879, 883 (D.N.J. 1934)
("There is no law that one who restrains trade forfeits one's property to any person who wishes
to take it.").
11. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
12. Id. at 489.
13. Id. at 492-93
14. Id.
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The Supreme Court held that it would not aid Morton in impermis-
sibly extending the scope of its patent, even though the defendant may
have been infringing Morton's patent. 5 The Court recognized that Mor-
ton was using the patent on the machine to effectively restrain competi-
tion in the salt market. The Court stated that the patent law forbids the
use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not
granted by the Patent Office.16 Because Morton had attempted to extend
the scope of its patent in violation of the antitrust laws, the Court refused
to aid Morton in its inequitable conduct.' 7
While it is common for the violation of antitrust laws to trigger the
patent misuse defense, a wide variety of inequitable conduct will support
the defense. In order for the defendant to employ the patent misuse de-
fense, the defendant must show that the patentee has attempted to imper-
missibly expand the scope of the patent. The Supreme Court held that
the issue is not "necessarily whether the patentee has violated the Clay-
ton Act, but whether a court of equity will lend its aid to protect the
patent monopoly."'"
Morton Salt holds that tie-in arrangements will support a misuse
defense."' However, this is not the only conduct underlying such a de-
fense. In American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,2" an insis-
tence upon only licensing patents in a mandatory package license rather
than individually was held to be patent misuse per se. A patent tie-out
will also support a charge of patent misuse. A patent tie-out is when a
15. Id. at 493-94.
16. Id. at 492. See also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180
(1980) (relief against patent infringement is denied if the patentee "has attempted illegally to
extend the scope of his patent monopoly..
17. 314 U.S. at 493.
18. Id. at 490.
19. Id. There are two types of tie-in arrangements. The first is where the patent owner
ties a staple to the patent license. A staple is an item which has substantial uses other than in
the patented item. The salt in Morton Salt is an example of a tied staple. The other type of
tying arrangement involves tied non-staples. These are items which are used only in conjunc-
tion with the patented good. It was originally thought that a tie-in arrangement concerning
non-staple goods could not support a misuse defense and was actually the basis of a contribu-
tory infringement action. However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that such a tie-in would
support a misuse defense. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944).
This was later rejected by Congress when it passed 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) and (d) (1952), in which
it was stated that tie-in arrangements of non-staples would constitute contributory infringe-
ment. The Court, by only a 5 to 4 decision, followed Congress' instructions when they next
had the chance to address the issue. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176
(1980). For a thorough discussion on the staple tie-in and non-staple tie-in misuse distinction,
see OPPENHEIM, ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, 933-45 (West 4th ed. 1981). Subsec-
tions 4 and 5 of Section 271(d) were added in 1988. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988).
20. 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959) (it is arguable that this blanket license is a form of a tie-in
arrangement). This holding was followed in Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith, 388 F.2d 25
(7th Cir. 1969), modified, 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
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patent owner conditions licensing of its patent upon the requirement that
the licensee not use or manufacture goods which would compete with the
licensed patented good.21 Any conduct which a court finds impermissi-
bly extends the patent rights will support a misuse defense.22
B. Defense Analysis
In Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. Bic Leisure Prods., Inc.,2 3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit discussed the application
of patent misuse analysis to licensing agreements. In Windsurfing, the
holder of a sailboard patent had inserted a clause in its licensing agree-
ments that required licensees to refrain from infringing the patentee's
trademark.
The court held that when the objectionable conduct is analyzed, "a
factual determination must reveal that the overall effect of the license
tends to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined rele-
vant market."24 In applying this to the Windsurfing licensing agree-
ments, the court held that the patentee was merely asserting its valid
rights under the federal trademark act and that this conduct did not rise
to the level of patent misuse."
The misuse defense is not limited to one who has experienced dam-
ages as a direct result of the patentee's conduct. A third party can also
assert the defense without actually being affected by the patentee's mis-
use.2 6 As previously mentioned, the petitioner in Morton Salt was not a
direct victim of the tying arrangement. It appears that courts have ex-
tended this defense to third parties because of judicial aversion to assist-
ing the unlawful expansion of the patents, and not to compensate the
defendant for any alleged misconduct.
C. Defense Elements
While the rules stated above appear to give an infringer broad lee-
way in claiming the misuse defense, there is at least one additional formal
requirement that must be satisfied.
First, a relationship between the patent in suit and the patentee's
improper conduct must exist.27 An alleged infringer can not use an-
21. Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1964).
22. Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 180.
23. 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
24. Id. at 1001-02.
25. Id. at 1002.
26. GERALD SOBEL, EXPLOITATION OF PATENTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS IN TECH-
NOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION 111, 115 (1990).
27. Monarch Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Duncan Parking Meter Maintenance Co., No. 82 Civ.
2599 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 1988) (Westlaw, Genfed library, Dist. file), vacated on other grounds,
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ticompetitive conduct in connection with an unrelated patent. 2' This
analysis is distinct from the Court's rejection of Morton's argument that
the objectionable conduct must be part of the subject matter at dispute.2 9
Because Morton sued for direct infringement of the patent and not for
any issue concerning the tie-in, Morton claimed that there was no issue
of its tying arrangement. The Court rejected this argument. Since there
was a relationship between the objectionable conduct, i.e. tying the pat-
ent license to a non-patented good and the patent that Morton claimed
was being infringed, the patent served as a link between the inequity and
the rights sought to be enforced.
In addition to the relationship requirement some commentators
have proposed that the court apply a second requirement to patent mis-
use cases. This would require all alleged misuses to be considered under
a J"rule of reason" analysis.3° Due to the unique nature of patents, the
reasonableness of the restriction would be studied to decide if the patent
owner's conduct is egregious.
In its Vertical Restraint Guidelines of 1985, the Department of Jus-
tice stated that antitrust per se analysis should not be applied to pat-
ents.3 The Department of Justice has since reaffirmed its deference to
patents in the face of claims of antitrust violations. In 1988, the Depart-
ment released the International Antitrust Guidelines which set forth the
Department's analysis.3 2 The new approach states that the intellectual
property owners are "entitled to enjoy whatever market power the prop-
erty itself may confer."33 As long as intellectual property licenses are not
merely shams, the guidelines set forth a rule of reason analysis.34
The Department's rule of reason is premised upon two basic philos-
ophies. 3' First, as long as the arrangement is not a sham but simply an
No. 82 Civ. 2599 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1988). (An asserted antitrust misuse defense failed where
defendant claimed that plaintiff was engaged in an illegal tying arrangement with a patent that
was not in the present dispute.)
28. Id. (Court refused to accept alleged antitrust violations in connection with patent on
label as unrelated to suit to enforce separate patent on label.)
29. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942).
30. Roger B. Andewelt, Competition Policy and the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 25 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 604, 641 (Nov. 11, 1982).
31. U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE VERTICAL RESTRAINT GUIDELINES 2.4 (1985). In its pertinent
part, the department report stated that the guidelines do not apply to intellectual property
licenses as restrictions if such licenses are necessary to promote full technological development.
32. 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988).
33. Id. at S-16, § 3.6.
34. Id. at S-17, § 3.62.
35. One commentator has even argued that any patent misuse should be dealt with by the
Antitrust Division and the FTC, and that the patent misuse defense should not be applied.
Robert H. Hoerner, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1479, §§ 262-63 (Aug. 16, 1990)
(Any misuse should not result in the loss of the property right to exclude.).
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effort by the intellectual property owner to appropriate the full inherent
value of his creation, the Department will not challenge the arrange-
ment.36 Second, the arrangement will not be required to create competi-
tion in the owner's technology.37 The Department's rule of reason
analysis consists of four steps.3" First, the Department determines
whether the arrangement restrains competition between parties in the
relevant market, and if so, whether it facilitates the use of market
power.39 Second, the Department determines whether the arrangement
restrains competition in any other market in which the parties actually or
potentially compete." Third, the Department looks for vertical effects of
collusion or anticompetitive exclusion. 4' Fourth, the Department runs
the arrangement through an "efficiency filter" to determine whether the
anticompetitive risks are outweighed by any procompetitive benefits.42
D. Codification
Congress has shown its acceptance of the defense. In the 1952 U.S.
Patent Code, Congress stated that one who would otherwise be entitled
to relief from infringement shall not be "deemed guilty of misuse or ille-
gal extension of the patent right" by reason of having used the patent to
prevent contributory infringement.43 While actually passed to clarify the
issue of contributory infringement,4" this section specifically recognizes
the defense of misuse by excluding from it certain actions.
Later amendments limited but did not abolish the misuse defense.
In 1988, Congress passed the Patent Misuse Reform Act,45 which had
36. 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 1391, § 17.
37. Id.
38. For a thorough discussion on the Department's four-step approach, see Comments of
Roger B. Andwelt, Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division, before ABA, Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Division (July 16, 1985), discussed in Sobel supra note 26, at 169-
72.
39. Id. at 167-69.
40. Id. at 169.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988).
44. OPPENHEIM, ET AL., supra fiote 19, at 940.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4-5) (1988).
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement ... of a patent
shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent
right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: ... (4) refused to
license or use rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the
patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in
another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of circumstances,
the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented
product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
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the effect of eliminating the presumption that use of a patent license to
create a tie-in is per se misuse. Although this passage did limit prior case
law concerning patent misuse, it once again showed congressional recog-
nition that misuse is a valid defense to an infringement claim. The Pat-
ent Misuse Reform Act does not extend this protection to cases where
the patent owner already has market power in either the patent market
or tied good market.46
The Senate also had an opportunity to discuss the analysis of an-
ticompetitive conduct derived from patent rights. While discussing the
passage of the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA),47 the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary studied various sections dealing with the
misuse defense. The effect of these provisions would have been to codify
the approach of Department of Justice and require certain patent license
agreements to be analyzed under the rule of reason.
The NCRA had a proposed section, Title IV, which dealt with the
analysis of patent misuse. Under this section, the U.S. Patent Code48
would have been amended to specify six patent licensing practices to be
excluded from the category of patent misuse. 49 However, the Senate
Committee excised this title from the act to guarantee its passage.50 In
its present form, the NCRA does not affect the case law definition of
patent misuse.
E. Purging the Conduct
To maintain the original equity justification for the misuse defense,
courts will not enforce the defense in cases in which the patentee has
ceased the anticompetitive conduct. Thus, a patent owner may avoid the
misuse claim by purging the culpable conduct.51 The Supreme Court
stated that,
It is now, of course, familiar law that the courts will not aid a patent
owner who has misused his patents to recover any of their emoluments
accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter until the effects of
such misuse have been dissipated, or "purged" as the conventional say-
ing goes.
52
46. Id.
47. The National Cooperative Research Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
49. These included agreements which affected commerce outside the scope of the patent,
licensee resale restrictions, excessive or unequal royalties, royalties based upon criteria other
than sales or products, refusal to license and any other conduct previously held to be patent
misuse. For a complete discussion on the development of the NCRA and its effects on the
misuse defense, see William B. Miller, Note, Giving the Patent Owner His Due: Recent Develop-
ments in the Antitrust/Patent Misuse Interface, 12 Del. J. Corp. L. 135, 144-48 (1987).
50. Id. at 142-43.
51. SOBEL, supra note 26, at 116-17.
52. United States Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co, 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
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The patent owner must satisfy a two-prong test to prove that the
conduct has been purged. First, the owner must show that the "im-
proper practices [have been] abandoned."53 Second, the owner must
show that the consequences of the conduct have been dissipated. 4 Thus,
the more egregious the conduct, the longer it will take for the effects to
dissipate. Courts do not have any set time in which the conduct need be
purged. It has been held that the time required for complete purging
depends upon the facts of each case."
After settling any doubt surrounding the existence of the patent mis-
use defense, the Supreme Court stated that the same defense could proba-
bly be extended to other forms of intellectual property, including
copyright and trademark. 6
II
The Copyright Misuse Defense
A. History
1. The Early Years
There is no Supreme Court case explicitly upholding the copyright
misuse defense, as Morton Salt 7 did for the patent misuse defense. There
has even been some disagreement about the existence of a copyright mis-
use defense.5" However, the Morton Salt Court stated, in dictum, that
patent misuse may also extend to copyrights. 9 The Court suggested that
this defense could be extended to "cases where relief for copyright in-
fringement was denied because of inequitable conduct on the part of the
plaintiff copyright owner."'  In its discussion, the Supreme Court cited
two cases.
53. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942).
54. SOBEL, supra note 26, at 116 (citing Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493).
55. Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 71 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
56. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494 (The Court stated "Similarly, equity will deny relief for
infringement of a trademark where the plaintiff is misrepresenting to the public the nature of
his product either by the trademark itself or by his label .. .also, for application of the like
doctrine in the case of copyright .... "). For a thorough discussion of this case and its applica-
tion to copyright misuse, see Timothy H. Fine, Misuse and Antitrust Defenses to Copyright
Infringement Actions, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 315, 318-19 (1965).
57. See Id, and accompanying text.
58. While the Court's dictum in Morton Salt supports the belief that misuse is a valid
defense to copyright infringement, some authorities believed as recently as 1990 that the mis-
use defense was not applicable to copyright infringement actions. SOBEL, supra note 26, at 118
("The doctrine of misuse does not apply to copyright infringement.").
59. 314 U.S. at 494.
60. Fine, supra note 56, at 318-19 (citing 314 U.S. at 494). The Court also discussed the
applicable defenses to cases in which the copyright owner attempted to extend its copyright
beyond the granted scope and was held to be in restraint of trade. Id.
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In Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book,6 the plaintiff
brought an action claiming that the defendant had infringed its copy-
righted encyclopedia. The court found that the defendant was not guilty
of copyright infringement. In its dicta the court held that if it were to
find the defendant had been guilty of infringement, so had the plaintiff.62
As such, "[a]n author who has pirated a large part of his work from
others is not entitled to have his copyright protected."63 However, the
court did not say that it would invalidate the plaintiff's copyright, only
that it would not protect the copyright. 64
This language was mirrored in Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan
Piano Co.65 There, the plaintiff had sued for copyright infringement of
its book of forms. The court held that the defendant had not infringed
any copyright because the book was not copyrightable. The court also
stated that if the book's contents were "misleading and deceptive, they
will find the doors of a court of equity barred against their admission. "66
In its Morton Salt holding, the Court stated that grounds for barring
Morton's infringement action were the same as that which precludes a
copyright owner's suit for violation of a retail price maintenance provi-
sion. 67 In support of this proposition, the Court cited Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus.
68
In Bobbs-Merrill the plaintiff had inserted a provision in copies of its
book stating that sale of the book below the specified price would infringe
the book's copyright. The Court held that the plaintiff had attempted to
extend its rights beyond that conferred by the copyright laws and that
retail price maintenance was not a right conferred to copyright owners.
Due to this inequitable conduct, the plaintiff's copyright would not be
enforced against the defendant.69
The early years seemed to exhibit a recognition of a copyright mis-
use defense, yet there was still much confusion. Although the Supreme
Court's dicta in Morton Salt did imply that the misuse defense could be
used by copyright infringers, there was still no decision to explicitly ap-
ply it to copyright action.
61. 122 F. 922 (C.C.A.N.Y. 1903).
62. Id. at 925.
63. Id. at 926.
64. 314 U.S. at 494.
65. 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915).
66. Id. at 843.
67. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1942).
68. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
69. Id. at 345.
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2. The Middle Age
The first case to explicitly uphold a copyright misuse defense was M.
Witmark & Sons v. Jensen.7° Witmark concerned copyright owners who
were members of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP). They owned copyrighted musical works that were
licensed to ASCAP in a uniform plan for use in movie soundtracks.
These licenses granted licensees only the right to synchronize the copy-
righted music with movie soundtracks. The license did not confer the
right of public performance.7' The defendants were charged with in-
fringing this right.72
The defendants contended that because the collective acts of the
plaintiffs in their actions with ASCAP violated the antitrust laws,73 the
plaintiffs were barred by the misuse defense from enforcing their copy-
rights. The court agreed and held that the plaintiffs were guilty of imper-
missibly expanding their copyright monopoly.74 The court refused to
extend its equity powers to assist the plaintiffs.
Various conduct which seeks to unlawfully expand the copyright
rights can act as a bar to a copyright owner's claim of infringement. The
copyright owner must use the copyright in an attempt to expand the ex-
clusionary power beyond that granted by the copyright before the de-
fendant's defense of copyright misuse may be successful.
B. Recent Developments
1. F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago
In F.E. L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 7 the Sev-
enth Circuit discussed an infringement claim brought by a publisher of
songs. The publisher had developed an Annual Copying License, which
allowed any licensee to copy any song in F.E.L.'s fourteen hundred song
70. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948).
71. A copyright actually consists of numerous rights, including the rights to exclude
others from: reproducing the work, making a derivative work, distributing the work, public
performance, and displaying the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l)-(5) (1988).
72. 80 F. Supp. at 844.
73. This case was heard before Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), in which the Court decided that ASCAP's arrangements were not
horizontal restraints of trade under the antitrust laws.
74. 80 F. Supp. at 849-50. The court relied upon the case of Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v.
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
This early decision concluded that ASCAP's licenses were violative of the antitrust laws. As
such, the court concluded that aiding the plaintiff would be paramount to it placing its impri-
matur on a scheme which involves misuse of an intellectual property privilege. Witmark, 80 F.
Supp. at 850.
75. 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 198 2).
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collection for a yearly fee.76 The defendant claimed that the publisher
was barred from bringing the infringement action based upon the misuse
defense.77
The defendant claimed that the licensing agreement required them
to place copyright notice on any song or part of a song copied, even if
only words were copied. 78 The defendant argued that this could result in
the requirement of copyright notice on words in the public domain and,
as such, F.E.L. had expanded its rights beyond the bounds of its
copyright.79
The court rejected this argument. It found that the licensing agree-
ment was reasonable and was not sufficient basis for finding misuse.8 °
Even if it were, the court concluded that the balance of equities weighed
in favor of F.E.L. and it could not bar F.E.L.'s claim on this conduct.8
2. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds
The Fourth Circuit recently held that the defense of copyright mis-
use could be applied against a copyright owner who had shown infringe-
ment of its copyrighted computer program. In Lasercomb America, Inc.
v. Reynolds,82 the court had the opportunity to review the question of
whether the copyright misuse defense exists.
a. Lasercomb Facts
In Lasercomb, a software program developer charged a steel die
manufacturer with copyright infringement. The plaintiff had developed a
computer program, Interact, which allowed a designer to create a tem-
plate of a cardboard cutout on a computer screen and the software di-
rected the mechanized creation of a conforming steel rule die.83
Lasercomb licensed four copies of the software to the Holiday Steel
Rule Die Corporation, the employer of the two defendants, Job Reynolds
and Larry Holiday.84 Holiday Steel then breached the protective devices
attached to the programs and made three unauthorized copies of Inter-
76. This licensing agreement is not unlike the arrangement found reasonable under anti-
trust laws in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
77. 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 1982)
78. Id. at 409 n.9.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
83. Id. at 971.
84. Id. Lasercomb charged Holiday $35,000 for the first copy, $17,500 for each of the
next two and $2,000 for the fourth. Lasercomb informed the defendant that it could purchase
additional copies for $2,000 a copy.
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act. 5 The defendants removed devices called "chronoguards" from the
licensed copies but told the plaintiff that these protective devices were
still intact.8 6
Reynolds and Holiday then created a software program called PDS-
1000, which was almost a direct copy of the plaintiff's Interact program
and marketed it as their own die making program. 7 Reynolds slightly
altered the software so the copied program's output would appear to be
different from the plaintiff's program. 8 Lasercomb discovered this, reg-
istered its copyright in Interact, and filed suit alleging copyright infringe-
ment, trade secret misappropriation, false designation of origin, fraud,
breach of contract, and unfair competition.89
b. The Trial
During the trial, the defendants raised various defenses, including
the copyright misuse defense.90 However, the trial court found for the
plaintiff and rejected the misuse defense and other defenses. The court
awarded Lasercomb $105,000 in damages and permanently enjoined the
defendants from publishing and marketing the PDS-1000 program. 91
c. The Appellate Court's Analysis
On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court erred in its
failure to recognize the copyright misuse defense.92 Reynolds and Holi-
day contended that even though Lasercomb had a valid copyright, which
they infringed, the plaintiffs had abused it in their licensing agreements.93
The license agreement contained a clause which prohibited licensees
from participating in any manner in the creation of computer-assisted
85. Id. at 971.
86. Id. at 971-72.
87. Id. at 971.
88. Id. at 972.
89. Id. The court dismissed the misappropriation of trade secrets, false designation of
origin, and unfair competition as preempted by the United States Copyright Act.
90. Id. at 972.
91. Id. The $105,000 award was against the defendants Holiday Steel, Reynolds and Hol-
iday jointly and severally, for the copyright infringement claims. The court also awarded
Lasercomb $10,000 from Holiday and $5,000 from Reynolds as punitive damages. In addi-
tion, the court found that Lasercomb had been damaged in the amount of $105,000 on the
fraud claim, but could only allow one recovery as both injuries arose out of the same conduct.
Id. n.3.
92. Id.
93. Id. The defendants also claimed that Lasercomb had misused its copyright by creat-
ing an illegal tie-in. Reynolds and Holiday contended that Lasercomb had discounted its price
on the Interact program when it was purchased along with steel rule dies and other goods.
The appellate court held that the trial court had properly rejected this as a tie-in. Id. n.6.
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die-making software.9 4 The defendants themselves were not bound by
this agreement as they had never signed it. However, Reynolds and Hol-
iday were able to prove at trial that at least one licensee had entered into
the agreement." The trial court had rejected the misuse defense for
three reasons. First, the defendants had not signed the agreement and,
therefore, they were not bound to the terms of the restriction. Second,
the court found that the restriction was "reasonable in the light of secre-
tive and delicate nature of computer technology." And, third, the trial
court was not convinced that a copyright misuse defense even existed.96
The appellate court addressed these concerns after reviewing the
patent misuse defense. The court found that the same public rational
underlying the patent misuse defense, as set forth in Morton Salt, was
applicable to a copyright misuse defense.97 While the appellate court rec-
ognized the confusion over the existence of the copyright misuse defense,
it held that such a defense was inherent to copyright law. 98
Next, the appellate court considered whether the trial court cor-
rectly refused a misuse defense on the basis that the restriction was rea-
sonable. It held that the trial court erred in this finding. The court
stated that the trial court's apparent analysis on the "rule of reason"
concept of antitrust violations was misplaced.99
The appellate court adopted the reasoning of the Morton Salt Court
belief that a misuse defense need not be based upon an antitrust violation.
It stated that while "the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust
law probably would give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the con-
verse is not necessarily true-a misuse need not be a violation of antitrust
94. Id. at 973. The pertinent clause read:
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it will not permit or
suffer its directors, officers and employees, directly or indirectly, to write, develop,
produce or sell computer assisted die making software.
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1) year after
the termination of this Agreement, that it will not write, develop, produce or sell or
assist others in the writing, developing, producing or selling computer assisted die
making software, directly or indirectly without Lasercomb's prior written consent.
Any such activity undertaken without Lasercomb's written consent shall nullify any
warranties or agreements of Lasercomb set forth herein.
Id.
95. Id.
96. 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 374 (Aug. 30, 1990).
97. 911 F.2d at 973.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 978; see also 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 374 (1990) (recognizing
that the misplacement of the rule of reason analysis is understandable since patents and trade-
marks are often regarded as monopolies).
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law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an infringement
action." ioo
d. The Appellate Court's Holding
Applying this to the Lasercomb restriction, the appellate court
found that Holiday had shown a copyright misuse defense. The court
stressed that the "anticompetitive language in Lasercomb's licensing
agreement is at least as egregious as that which led [the court] to bar" a
previous patent infringement action.10' The court noted that the finding
of this misuse is similar to, but separate from, the analysis necessary to a
finding of antitrust violations.' 0 2
In keeping with the analogy to the patent misuse defense, the
Lasercomb court stated that the copyright owner can purge itself of the
conduct. It stated that it was not invalidating the copyright and that
Lasercomb would be free to bring a suit for infringement once it had
purged itself of the misuse. 10 3
3. Other Copyright Cases
The copyright misuse defense was again found to constitute a valid
defense to infringement actions in Broadcast Music Inc. v. Lifetime Tele-
vision. ° BMI was a holder of non-exclusive licenses from numerous
copyright owners to license the performing rights of their musical com-
positions. Lifetime, a cable television service, broadcast various movies
and programs. All of the rights to the music contained in the movies and
programming were included in the package the producer sold to the
cable television service, except the performance rights.'0 5
BMI offered to license all the music performing rights in a blanket
license with royalties equal to one percent of Lifetime's gross revenues.
Lifetime refused to pay this royalty claiming that it was four times
greater than BMI charges other broadcasters. BMI filed suit for copy-
right infringement and Lifetime responded by counterclaiming antitrust
violations and copyright misuse.' 0 6
The court recognized that the copyright misuse defense has been
received with some hesitation in the lower courts. However, it stated
that Lifetime's allegation that BMI had used its monopoly power to force
licensees to pay exorbitant prices for blanket licenses could constitute
100. 911 F.2d at 978.
101. Id. at 979.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 979 n.22.
104. 746 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
105. Id. at 323.
106. Id. at 322.
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inequitable conduct supporting a misuse defense. °7 The court held that
copyright misuse is a cognizable affirmative defense to infringement ac-
tions. However, Lifetime's argument that BMI's copyright misuse con-
stitutes an action for affirmative relief was rejected since the court could
find no precedent for such an argument and refused to create one. 108
In Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines, Corp.,' 09
the Pennsylvania district court held that copyright misuse was a valid
defense to a counterclaim of copyright infringement. The plaintiff had
brought several antitrust violation claims against IBM. IBM responded
with various counterclaims, including the assertion that Allen-Myland
had infringed IBM's copyright on its 3090 microcode." 0
In response, Allen-Myland contended that IBM could not enforce
its copyright because IBM's pricing practices of the 3090 microcode were
in violation of an earlier consent decree.' 1' The court agreed with Allen-
Myland. The court found that Allen-Myland had successfully shown a
copyright misuse defense and, therefore, the court refused to aid IBM in
exploiting its copyright."12
A recently filed case, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, "13
may tell us whether other jurisdictions will adopt the Lasercomb ra-
tional. Nintendo filed a copyright infringement suit against Atari for al-
leged infringement of computer game software. In response, Atari raised
a copyright misuse defense. 1 4
Atari claimed that Nintendo entered into agreements with software
developers to develop games for the Nintendo Entertainment System.
Nintendo approves the licensee's game, manufacturers it, and sells it
back to the licensee for resale to the public. " " There are clauses in these
licensing agreements which prohibit the licensee from developing any li-
censed game for any other home videogame system for a period of two
years."I6
Nintendo raised two objections against the application of the copy-
right misuse defense. First, Nintendo claimed that the defense has only
been held to apply where the copyright has been used to either violate the
107. Id. at 328.
108. Id.
109. 746 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
110. Id. at 541.
111. Id. at 546-47.
112. Id. at 547.
113. Memorandum in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am. Inc., No. C-88-4805-FMS (N.D. Cal filed Feb. 21, 1989).
114. Id. at 17.
115. Nintendo Claims Misuse Defense Not Applicable, COMPUTER LAW STRATEGIST, Dec.
1990 at 7.
116. Id.
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antitrust laws or to severely hamper competition. Nintendo argued that
neither of these justifications are applicable to a two-year provision with-
out a showing that the provisions have any unlawful anticompetitive
effect. 117
Nintendo next argued that even if the misuse defense is applicable,
there is no evidence that a two-year restriction is unreasonable.
Nintendo compared its two-year restriction with the ninety-nine year re-
striction of the plaintiff in Lasercomb. Not only does this fail to have any
anticompetitive effect, Nintendo argued, but in conjunction with its limi-
tation of games any licensee may license with Nintendo, it actually has
pro-competitive effects. Nintendo claims that its licenses, unlike the egre-
gious clause in Lasercomb, do not withdraw from the public the creative
abilities of the licensees. 118
C. Conduct Underlying Copyright Misuse
Like patents, the use of a copyright related to a tied good can be a
basis for a misuse defense. In Orth-C- Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 119
an illegal tying arrangement was found to support a claim of copyright
misuse. In FE.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 120 the
court stated that the act of extracting money for works in the public
domain could also be seen as misuse.121 In general, like the patent mis-
use defense, an allegation of copyright misuse can be supported by any
conduct which illegally attempts to or does expand the scope of granted
rights. 122
With the incredible growth of the computer industry, the doctrine of
copyright misuse may become a popular defense. As infringement ac-
tions among computer programmers increase, it is inevitable that most
defendants will search for some inequitable conduct by the plaintiff on
which to assert a misuse defense. This makes drafting program licensing
agreements even more difficult. 123 However, due to the high costs of de-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
120. 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 1982).
121. The legislative history of the Semi-Conductor Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914
(1988), includes a reference to one of the earliest precedents on copyright misuse. It is likely
that misuse of a maskwork right can also support a misuse defense claim.
122. Peter W. Hohenhaus, Misuse of Copyright as a Defense to Infringement Actions: Does a
"Clean Hands" Doctrine Apply to Software? (Westlaw, Intellectual Prop. library, JLR file).
123. One commentator has stated that the success of the misuse defense in the recent com-
puter program infringement cases requires that all license drafters avoid a number of practices.
These include restricting use of software that is not the basis of the license, restrictions on
independent development, limitations on the licensee's comparative shopping, tie-in arrange-
ments, unreasonable pricing, and biased pricing techniques. Id. at 8-9.
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velopment and need for secrecy in the technological fields, courts must
also be careful not to indiscriminately apply the misuse defense.
III
The Trademark Misuse Defense
In trademark law, evidence exists that various inequitable conduct
will also bar a claim of trademark infringement. In the Lanham Act,
evidence that the trademark is being used to violate the antitrust laws can
support a petition for cancellation, even if the mark is incontestable. 2 '
While there is much similarity between the copyright misuse and the
patent misuse defenses, there is a substantial difference between these and
the misuse of a trademark. In the United States, patents and copyrights
find their legal origin in Article I of the Constitution. 25 They are
granted to reward innovators and creators. However, trademarks devel-
oped from common law attempts to protect consumers from being misled
as to source and sponsorship of the goods. Thus, while equity may be
reluctant to aid one who misuses a trademark, equity also has an aver-
sion to the possible result of this inaction: continued consumer
confusion.
A. Early Case Law
One of the earliest cases of trademark misuse was decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Worden v. California Fig Syrup Co.'2 6 In
Worden, a producer of a laxative labeled 'Syrup of Figs' sued to enforce
its trademark.' 27 The Court noted that the laxative contained no fig
syrup and stated "if the plaintiff makes any material false statement in
connection with the property which he seeks to protect, he loses his right
to claim the assistance of a court of equity."' 128
Worden has been recently interpreted to mean that "a court should
not protect the exclusive right to use a name or mark which is misleading
to the public."' 129 Thus, the Worden holding sets forth the rule that
where a trademark is materially deceptive or misleading, a court of eq-
uity will not aid the wrongdoer in protecting the mark. 3 °
124. 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(7) (1988); see MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 31:24.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
126. 187 U.S. 516 (1903).
127. Id. at 533.
128. Id. at 528.
129. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 1985) (quot-
ing Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1355 (1 1th Cir. 1983)).
130. One commentator has stated that the Worden principle simply requires that the public
be told the truth. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 31:16, at 592. Professor McCarthy noted, with
disapproval, that sometimes courts have strained to find some marks nondeceptive by assum-
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In Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. JA. Buchroeder & Co., 13' a Mis-
souri district court applied the misuse defense to infringement of an or-
ganization's affiliation mark. There, a group of jewelers charged nation-
wide fraternities and sororities with violating the antitrust laws by con-
spiring to limit the competition among producers of their insignia.132 As
a counterclaim, the defendant organizations claimed that the plaintiffs
were infringing the trademarks of the fraternities and sororities.'33
The court reviewed the history of the patent misuse defense and
noted that as in the case of patent misuse, efforts to exceed the legal scope
of trademarks should be consistently rejected.134 In reviewing past trade-
mark cases and the history of the unclean hands doctrine, the court
found that the misuse defense was also applicable to trademarks. 135
Turning to the facts before it, the court discussed whether the frater-
nities' and sororities' alleged antitrust violations could render their trade-
mark unenforceable. 136 The court reviewed the history of the Lanham
Act and found that the Department of Justice had originally been
strongly opposed to its enactment. 3 7 In order to appease the Depart-
ment's concerns, the trademark bill had been revised to include viola-
tions of the United States antitrust laws as a defense to possible
infringement claims. 3 ' The court concluded that an antitrust violation
was an anticipated and viable defense to a charge of trademark
infringement. 1
39
In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VE.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena,"4 the misuse de-
fense was analyzed and supported but found not to apply. There, the
plaintiff brought a claim of trademark infringement, alleging that the de-
fendant had used deceptively similar marks. The defendant claimed that
ing a high standard of care for the consumer. In Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Wallach Bros., 172
F. 859 (2d Cir. 1909), the court held that no buyer would ever be so gullible to believe that
holes would never appear in hosiery under the mark of HOLEPROOF.
131. 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
132. Id. at 970.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. The Department of Justice had attached to its opposition report an appendix which
labeled trademarks as instruments of monopolies and restraints of trade. The Department
stated that trademarks had been used as a means of geographic market division, customer
market division, vertical market discrimination, and monopolistic control. Id. at 978.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1988).
139. 251 F. Supp. at 977-79.
140. 298 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert denied,
403 U.S. 905 (1971).
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the plaintiff was barred from asserting its claim due to its antitrust
violations. 14
The plaintiff argued that evidence of antitrust abuse only serves to
defeat the presumption of validity under the Lanham Act and does not
serve as a complete ban to an infringement action. The court spent con-
siderable time discussing the legislative history of the Lanham Act and
studied the comments from the Act's drafters. 42
The court concluded that, insofar as the defendant based its trade-
mark misuse defense upon the Lanham Act, the misuse defense must fail.
However, the court stated that the discussion did not end at that point.
The court cited the Morton Salt holding in support of the proposition
that a finding of antitrust violations could serve as a basis for defending
an infringement action. 43
In its discussion, the court noted the vital differences between a pat-
ent and a trademark. 144 Notwithstanding these differences, the court
stated that "a court, in the exercise of its equity powers, may deny en-
forcement of a trademark on the part of one who has used that trade-
mark in violation of the antitrust laws."' 145
The court held that it is not enough in an infringement action that a
defendant prove that merchandise bearing a trademark has been used in
furtherance of antitrust violations. 146 The court said that to accept this
as satisfaction of a misuse claim would result in forfeiture of a trademark
in such a broad spectrum of distribution plans as to frustrate the policy
underlying trademark enforcement. 41
It is essential that the alleged infringer prove "that the mark itself
has been the basic and fundamental vehicle required and used to accom-
plish the violation."' 41 In applying this principle to the defendant's case,
141. The alleged misuses consisted of:
(1) combining with American distributer and franchise dealers to maintain prices,
(2) restricting sales by certain dealers to limited territories,
(3) restricting sales to certain customer classes,
(4) tying goods with trademark to other goods,
(5) unlawful price discrimination, and
(6) trying to eliminate competition in the sale of certain products.
Id. at 1311.
142. Id. at 1311-14.
143. Id. at 1314.
144. Id. The court held that any anti-competitive use of a trademark poses a less serious
threat to the national economic health than misuse of patents. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1315.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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the court held that the trademark use was merely collateral to any
violation. 149
The court stated that the second essential element of a trademark
misuse defense is that the defendant must show a connection between the
plaintiffs and the alleged antitrust conduct which is sufficient to satisfy
the plaintiff's legal responsibility. In applying this factor to the defend-
ant's case, the court held that the defendant had once again failed to
meet its burden.150
While the trademark misuse defense may have been a disappointing
effort in legal advocacy for the defendants in Zeiss, the case successfully
set forth both the parameters of the trademark misuse defense and its
acceptance.
B. Modern Case Law
Modem cases have reaffirmed the required elements of the trade-
mark misuse defense. Recent cases have refused to extend the trademark
misuse defense unless the misuse is relevant to the parties' litigation.
In Coca-Cola Co. v. Howard Johnson Co., ' ' the Georgia district
court refused to apply the defense in a case in which the conduct was
only remotely involved in the claims. Coca-Cola alleged that the defend-
ant hotel was serving a competitor's drinks when customers requested
plaintiff's drink, Coca-Cola.' 52
The defendant hotel claimed, in addition to other defenses, that
Coca-Cola had misused its trademark and that equity should refrain
Coca-Cola from enforcing the mark. The defendant complained specifi-
cally that the plaintiff had imposed various territorial resale restrictions
upon its licensed users, imposed tie-in requirements on licensees, and
used its power to attain monopoly status. '"
The court reviewed the history of the unclean hands doctrine, the
effect of the Lanham Act, and recent case law and concluded that the
misuse defense, as a general rule, is not a sufficient defense to trademark
infringement. 54 It relied upon Zeiss, which reasoned that a court should
reject the misuse defense where the claim merely asserts activities using
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1317.
151. 386 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
152. Id. at 333.
153. Id. at 334, 338. The defendant, like the defendant in Morton Salt and Lasercomb, was
not a party to these licensing arrangements.
154. Id. at 334-35.
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the trademark as opposed to the trademark being used as the prime and
effective instrument of the misuse. 55
The Coca-Cola court concluded that "an 'unclean hands' defense,
whether arising from violation of the antitrust laws or some other laws,
can be utilized in trademark infringement ... cases." 156 However, the
court also recognized the qualitative difference between trademarks and
other intellectual property rights. It stated that while more attenuated
conduct may support a patent misuse defense, there must be "an immedi-
ate and necessary relationship between the relief the plaintiff seeks and
the conduct giving rise to the 'unclean hands' " in trademark cases.15 7
The court found that the complained of conduct, while involving the
trademark, was not immediate and necessarily related to the claims
before it and refused to find a trademark misuse defense.' 5"
One recent case illustrates that certain conduct will be found to con-
stitute a basis for a misuse defense to trademark infringement. In United
States Jaycees v. Cedar Rapid Jaycees, 59 a national leadership training
organization sought an injunction to prevent a local chapter from using
its trademark. The local chapter contended that its license to use the
trademark was canceled because it admitted women into its chapter. The
chapter contended that this illegal gender discrimination was the basis of
the trademark dispute.1"
The court held that "[t]he public interest in preventing trademark
infringement and in preventing market confusion is outweighed in this
case by the government interest in preventing invidious discrimina-
tion." 1 61 These cases show that a central element of any trademark mis-
use defense is that the objectionable conduct must be relevant and related
to the subject of the litigation.
Recent cases have also restated that any deceptive or misleading
trademark must be materially deceptive and misleading in order to con-
stitute misuse. In Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 162 a plain-
tiff's advertisement that its hamburgers were "ground steak" was found
not to be a materially false statement. Following the early Worden stan-
dard, the court found that it was not precluded from enforcing its trade-
155. Id. at 335 (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309,
1311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
156. Id. at 336. The court also provides a list of numerous other cases finding misuse a
defense to trademark infringement and unfair competition cases. Id. at 336 n.4.
157. Id. at 337.
158. Id.
159. 614 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Iowa 1985), affid, 794 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1986).
160. Id. at 517.
161. Id. at 518.
162. 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987).
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mark. Because the misstatement was not material and the trademark not
misleading, the court could properly enforce the plaintiff's mark.1 63
IV
Conclusion
Notwithstanding some confusion and disagreement, the misuse de-
fense is a strong and often-asserted defense to patent, copyright, and
trademark infringement actions. There appears to be varying degrees of
application to the different intellectual properties. 16 However, in all
three categories, there is a two-step approach for the practitioner to use.
First, avoid any conduct and license restrictions which will support a
misuse claim. Second, if any misconduct or restrictions are revealed, the
practitioner must purge the client of this activity as soon as possible in
order to regain its exclusionary property rights.
Despite serving as the basis for later misuse defenses, the patent mis-
use defense is now in a schizophrenic state. Most case law follows the
original Morton Salt holding in applying the misuse defense. However,
administrative and legislative bodies, ranging from the Department of
Justice to the U.S. Senate, have been whittling away at the misuse de-
fense as applied to patents. Thus, while a patent owner may be less con-
cerned with possible liability, the practitioner must still be aware of this
defense when drafting license agreements. In particular, tying arrange-
ments should be avoided.
Despite the fact that there is no copyright misuse case analogous to
Morton Salt, the use of this defense appears to be growing. The 4th Cir-
cuit's decision in Lasercomb breathed new life into a lifeless policy.
Other jurisdictions are now following suit. Due to the dramatic growth
in the computer industry, this defense may be applied in a larger number
of cases as industries attempt to protect valuable information via restric-
tive licensing plans. Despite the recent decrease in antitrust enforce-
163. Id.
164. One of the criticisms of the misuse defense is that it allows a party, who is obviously
infringing a proprietary right, to continue to infringe until the owner discontinues its inequita-
ble conduct. One compromise which may alleviate the apparent inequity of this result would
be for the courts to "blue pencil" licensing agreements. This approach will allow a court to cut
down or limit licensing restrictions in scope or duration to a reasonable manner and still pre-
vent a party from continuing its infringement. Such "blue penciling" appproaches have been
applied in employee non-competition covenants by a minority of courts. See Karpinski v.
Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1971) (Court penciled a restriction on the practice of
dentistry to only prohibit oral surgery). While this approach may alleviate the harshness of
the misuse defense for those companies which have innocently attempted to protect their valu-
able proprietary interests in licensing agreements, it would not prevent the application of the
misuse defense in those cases of greater egregious conduct such as antitrust violations and false
advertising.
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ments by the federal courts, should a copyright misuse case reach the
Supreme Court, it is likely that the Court, looking back to its Morton Salt
holding, would find the misuse defense a viable and enforceable defense.
Because of this, practitioners drafting copyright licenses must anticipate
the possible effect of any restrictions.
The copyright misuse defense has the potential of trapping a great
number of practitioners because the party claiming misuse does not have
to be a party to the license. This requires drafters to be aware that there
may be an infinite number of defendants, even some who truly infringe
upon the copyright, who can assert the defense.
* The attorney practicing in trademark licensing appears to have the
greatest leeway in the choice of license restrictions. Because of the aver-
sion to denying injunctive relief to situations that result in consumer con-
fusion, the success of a trademark misuse claim will be limited. This
does not mean that it is utterly precluded. Under both section 33(b)(7)
of the Lanham Act and principles of equity, egregious conduct will still
preclude a trademark owner from asserting her rights. Practitioners
should not expect to, nor be allowed to, raise the specter of consumer
protection to preclude a misuse defense claim. Attorneys must still an-
ticipate the adverse effects on the enforceability of their clients' marks
that egregious licensing may create.
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